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I saw a muskrat in the park
Lying at an entrance to her heme
Oval lIOund of underbelly exposed
Tiny feet with long shapely nails
Curled gracefully in death
Her buck teeth protru:ling slightly
Between parted lips
Chestnut hair
Rustled by the breeze
Still glistens
No wounds
Poison then
Feeling ill, did she try to make it heme
and get only this far -- to her doorstep?
Or, was she underground, and did she
want to die in the sun?
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Dear Etlitors:
I am a new reader of Between the ~
cies.
The article in the Sunmer, 1986,
issue by James Nelson, "Xenograft and Partial
Affections," together with the various responses, has pranpted this letter.
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It seems that Nelson rests his hypothetical case on a parent's "partial affection"
for his/her child, implying that parental
affection is of sum supreme significance
that virtual IIOral carte blanme may be
granted in its name.
In his "Response,"
Nelson states that "parental affection •
is surely aIIOng the IIOre IIOrally significant." He goes on to say, "Exactly where the
IOOral force of this kind of partial affection
cxxnes fran, and exactly how it relates to
spousal affections, filial affections, and so
forth, is sanething that requires further
investigation. " I dare say it requires further investigation--especially when Nelson's
entire xenograft case is built upon viewing
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I have been particularly intrigued with
the notion of deception.
Many species attempt to deceive competitors and predators.
In nost cases, such deception is not intentional, but it can be very difficult indeed
to decide what is and is not intentional
deception.
Chimpanzees appear to deceive
others intentionally.
There are also observations indicating that baboons may indulge
in intentional deception.
But what of the
broken-wing display of the plover when it
tries to lure potential predators away from
its nest?
My interest in this issue stems
from the fact, that it seems that intentional
deception involves a series of thoughts that
indicate that you are thinking that I am
thinking that you intend some specific action.
This circular reasoning appears to
indicate that you are self-conscious; that
is, you are capable of being the object of
your own thoughts. Intentional deception can
be
studied empirically and distinguished
(albeit with difficulty) from non-intentional
deception.
Of course, one then still has to
indicate what moral relevance, if any, such a
distinction has, but it seems to me that
mental complexity (or mental capacity) is
very imp::)rtant in developing a coherent theory of the noral status of different animals.

(continued from p. 2)
Parental affecti.0n solely in an almost sacred
light.
I do indeed grant that partial affections (not just parental) for those close to
us are brute facts that must be dealt with
whenever rroral duties are under discussion.
I suspect that on a hypothetical sinking
ship, my partial affection would lead me to
prefer saving my dog, that I personally know
and love, to saving a human stranger.
Why
are the partial affections of a person for a
non-human animal automatically dismissed by
Nelson as obviously less "rrorally worthy"
than those of a parent for his/her child? (I
am speaking here of Professor Aiken's chimp.)
Indeed, the love of a person for a pet animal
may closely resemble parental love, without,
however, the ego-supporting "chip off the old
block" element.

In conclusion, I hope to produce, in the
not too distant future, something a little
rrore concrete and satisfying on the nature of
animal suffering and consciousness and its
noral implications.
One does not need a
sophisticated noral theory to criticize some
uses of research anirnals--such as in LD50
testing or in research that causes easily
avoidable suffering or death. However, there
are a lot of research projects that do not
fall into such categories, and we are just
beginning to search for a rrorally satisfactory and consistent public consensus on when
animal research can be justified.
Of Hice,
Hodels and Hen was intended to help define
what some of the questions might be.
It was
my first book on this topic but, I hope, not
my last.

Toward the end of the xenograft article,
Nelson mentions !:lis opinion that there is a
rrorally relevant distinction between animals
and "marginal" humans, in that "marginal"
humans have suffered a so-called tragedy in
"becoming the psychological equals of animals."
A defective human is certainly not,
as Nelson puts it, the psychological equal of
a normal, healthy animal--this is a blatantly
anthropocentric statement. Birth defects are
a natural occurrence--a deformed or internally defective puppy is rejected by its rrother
and dies.
This may be sad" but it is no
tragedy.
A human infant may be born with
many mental and physical defects--why is this
seen as a tragedy?
I f the appeal to the
"tragedy"
of so-called "marginal" humans
automatically places such humans off limits
for medical exploitation, why is not birth ~
an animal in this world considered equally
tragic?
Certainly being granted no rroral
value whatsoever ought to be tragic enough to
warrant exemption from torture.
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